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The Common Foreign Security Policy after Rosneft: Still imperfect
but gradually subject to the rule of law
Case C-72/15, The Queen (PJSC Rosneft Oil Company) v. Her Majesty’s
Treasury, Judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber), of 28 March
2017, EU:C:2017:236.
1. Introduction
Decisions in the area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) are
of a political nature, and the principle of the separation of powers imposes
limits on the judicial control of conduct of the executive.1 This is the rationale
at the basis of the restrictions imposed in the Treaties on the jurisdiction of the
ECJ in this particular sector of EU law.2 The Grand Chamber decision in
Rosneft3 defines the scope of the two exceptions laid down by Article 275(2)
TFEU to the Court’s lack of jurisdiction with respect to the provisions of the
CFSP. The judgment provides important clarifications on the kind of remedies
available to control the legality of CFSP Decisions providing for restrictive
measures vis-à-vis natural or legal persons, or other non-State entities: such a
control can be exercised by means not only of the annulment action, but also
of the preliminary ruling on the validity of such acts.
The remedy of Article 267(1)(b) TFEU is available to monitor respect of
Article 40 TEU. This position is not revolutionary since the Treaty provisions
already provide a wide margin of manoeuvre to justify such an interpretation.
It was more difficult to define the scope of the notion of “review of legality”
enshrined in Article 275(2) TFEU.4 Rosneft extends the principles deriving
from Foto-Frost5 to CFSP for the first time,6 thus signalling a willingness of
1. See along these lines the point made in A.G. Wathelet’s Opinion, EU:C:2016:381,
para 52.
2. See Arts. 24(1) TEU and 275(1) TFEU.
3. For an interesting insight on the case see Butler, “A question of jurisdiction: Art. 267
TFEU preliminary references of a CFSP nature”, (2017) EP, 1–8.
4. See section 5.4. infra.
5. Case 314/85, Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost, EU:C:1987:452.
6. However, it is not the first time the possibility to apply the Foto-Frost principles in the
context of the CFSP is raised. A.G. Wahl had argued that national courts cannot declare a CFSP
act invalid since this would be against such principles. However, he concluded that since there
is no EU court to which that issue could be brought, the national court could at most suspend
Common Market Law Review 54: 1799–1834, 2017.
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the EU judiciary to ensure the monopoly of the review of legality even in this
field.7 However, there are still some limits.8 This is a crucial decision of
principle, not least because it affects the management of prominent CFSP acts,
such as those setting up restrictive measures. In the last couple of years, the
scope of the Court’s limited jurisdiction in the area of foreign affairs was
defined in Elitaliana9 and H,10 clarifying the interpretation of Article 275(2)
TFEU, introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. In these two judgments, it was
understood that the exceptions defined in Articles 24(1) TEU and 275(1)
TFEU to the general jurisdiction of the ECJ on the interpretation and
application of EU law should be interpreted narrowly, despite the clear
intention of the Treaty makers to screen CFSP as much as possible from the
scrutiny of the EU judiciary. What is, then, the place of the CFSP in the EU
legal order11 after Rosneft? The preliminary ruling further eroded the
immunity from jurisdiction for acts adopted in the field of CFSP and
contributed to a progressive “legalization” of this sector.12 The EU judiciary
makes the oversight on EU sanctions13 more thorough, upholding the right to
effective judicial protection – which is crucial in a Union based on the rule of
law. It should be acknowledged that the ECJ recognizes that the Council has a
wide margin of discretion in areas which involve political, economic and
societal choices on its part.14 Most importantly, it gives its blessing to the
political choice of increasing the costs to be borne by the Russian Federation
for its actions undermining Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and
independence by targeting a major player in the oil sector, which is in part
owned by the Russian State.15 This is not surprising and is in line with the
obligation to “practise mutual sincere cooperation,” enshrined in the last
applicability of the act vis-à-vis the applicant and, where appropriate, award him damages. See
Opinion of A.G. Wahl in Case C455/14 P, H. v. Council, EU:C:2016:212, paras. 102–103.
7. This is contrary to the suggestion made by A.G. Kokott in her View on Opinion 2/13,
EU:C:2014:2475, para 100.
8. See sections 5.1, 5.6, 6 infra.
9. Case C-439/13 P, Elitaliana v. Eulex Kosovo, EU:C:2015:753.
10. Case C-455/14 P, H. v. Council.
11. This expression is borrowed from Van Elsuwege, “EU external action after the collapse
of the pillar structure: In search of a new balance between delimitation and consistency,” 47
CML Rev. (2010), 995.
12. See Cardwell, “The legalization of the European Union foreign policy and the use of
sanctions”, (2015) CYELS, 289–310, at 292 and 297–298; Smith, “Diplomacy by decree: The
legalization of EU foreign policy”, (2001) JCMS, 79–104, at 79.
13. “Sanctions” and “restrictive measures” are used interchangeably for convenience.
14. Case C-440/14 P, National Iranian Oil Company v. Council, EU:C:2016:128, para 77.
15. Judgment, para 147.
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sentence of Article 13(2) TEU, which also applies to the ECJ in relation to the
Council.16
2. Legal context and the questions referred by the High Court of
Justice (England and Wales)
The key provision defining the ECJ’s task in the Treaty is the second sentence
of Article 19(1)TEU: to ensure that in the interpretation and application of the
Treaties, the law is observed. The CFSP is the area in which the “masters of
the Treaty” were willing to recognize only a limited form of judicial oversight.
The general rule here is immunity from jurisdiction for the CFSP provisions,
enshrined Article 24(1)(2) TEU.17 Article 275(1) TFEU elaborates on this
rule: “The ECJ of the European Union shall not have jurisdiction with respect
to the provisions relating to the common foreign and security policy nor with
respect to acts adopted on the basis of those provisions.”
However, the last sentence of Article 24(1)(2) TEU and Article 275(2)
TFEU identify two exceptions to the lack of review of CFSP acts: Article
24(1)(2) refers to the competence of the Court to “monitor compliance with
Article 40 TEU” (the so-called “non-affectation clause”),18 and “to review the
legality of certain decisions as provided for by the second paragraph of
Article 275 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.” Article
275(2) TFEU re-states the first exception in identical terms and specifies the
second one: the ECJ has jurisdiction to “rule in proceedings, brought in
accordance with the conditions laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article
263 of this Treaty, reviewing the legality of decisions providing for restrictive
measures against natural or legal persons adopted by the Council on the basis
of Chapter 2 of Title V of the Treaty on European Union.” The decisions
referred to in Article 275 TFEU are generally adopted on the basis of Article
29 TEU, and when they provide for economic sanctions, the Council “shall
adopt the necessary measures,” on the basis of Article 215(1) TFEU; these are
usually regulations.
16. On the limits posed by Art. 13(2) TEU on the Court’s role in interpreting the Treaties,
see Horsley, “Reflections on the role of the ECJ as the motor of European integration: Legal
limits to judicial law-making,” 50 CML Rev. (2013), 931–964.
17. “The Court of Justice of the European Union shall not have jurisdiction with respect to
the . . . provisions [of the CFSP].”
18. This provision ensures that when implementing the CFSP, the Union does not affect the
application of the procedures and the powers of the EU institutions in non-CFSP sectors. In
addition, when the EU implements policies other than the CFSP, it must respect the application
of the procedures and the powers of the EU institutions laid down by the Treaty for the exercise
of the competence in the CFSP.
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Rosneft is a legal entity active in the oil and gas sectors, controlled by a
State-owned company. It was included in the list of bodies engaging in the sale
or transportation of crude oil or petroleum products in September 2014.19 At
that time, the EU decided to reinforce the first round of sanctions imposed on
Russia, and on non-State actors such as banks, energy and defence industries,
enacted in July 2014, with the aim of causing heavy costs to the Russian
economy.20 The restrictive measures at stake were adopted through CFSP
Decision 2014/51221 (“the contested Decision”) and Regulation 833/2014
(“the contested Regulation”).22 They clearly affected Rosneft’s economic
activities since they imposed on operators, coming within the jurisdiction of
EU Member States, prohibitions or restrictions with respect to sensitive goods
and technologies destined for deep water oil exploration and production,
Arctic oil exploration and production, and shale oil projects. These measures
included the obligation to subject the direct or indirect sale, supply, transfer or
export of certain equipment suited to specific categories of exploration and
production projects in Russia to prior authorization,23 as well as the
stipulation to prohibit associated services necessary for these projects.24
Rosneft sought the annulment of selected provisions of the sanction regime
in an action before the General Court, in October 2014.25 Additionally,
approximately one month later, an action was brought before the High Court
of Justice of England and Wales by Rosneft’s subsidiary in the UK. In that
context, the applicant questioned the legality of the national legislation
implementing the provisions of the contested Regulation, which imposed on
Member States the obligation to provide for criminal penalties for any breach
of the latter act. The referring court considered that the action concerned the
validity of EU law acts; it took the view that while the jurisdiction of the ECJ
to examine the validity of CFSP measures falls outside the Foto-Frost26 case
law, CFSP measures could have a serious impact on natural and legal persons.
19. As of 8 Sept. 2014, Rosneft was included in the list of Annex III to Decision
2014/512/CFSP of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions
destabilizing the situation in Ukraine, O.J. 2014, L 229/13. On the context that led to
strengthening the sanctions, see Krause, “Western economic and political sanctions as
instruments of strategic competition with Russia – Opportunities and risks,” in Ronzitti,
Coercive Diplomacy, Sanctions and International Law (Brill, 2016), p. 271 et seq., at p. 279.
20. <www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/144158.pdf>, (last
visited 15 June 2017).
21. Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP, cited supra note 19.
22. Council Regulation (EU) 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in
view of Russia’s actions destabilizing the situation in Ukraine, O.J. 2014, L 229/1.
23. Art. 4 of Decision 2014/512.
24. Art. 4a of Decision 2014/512.
25. Case T-715/14, Rosneft v. Council, pending.
26. Case 314/85, Foto-Frost.
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Furthermore, the principle of access to a court to review the legality of acts of
the executive is a fundamental right. In the light of these premises, the national
judges raised three sets of questions: the first group asked whether the ECJ
had competence to rule on the validity of some of the provisions of the
CFSP Decision.27 The second group raised doubts over the validity of the
so-called “oil sector provisions”28 and the “security and lending provisions”29
of the CFSP Decision and of the contested Regulation, in addition to other
provisions of these two acts.30 In the referring order and written observations
presented by Rosneft, it was argued that the contested provisions of both
acts clash with Article 40 TEU, breach the Partnership and Cooperation
Agreement between the EU and Russia31 and were tainted by other reasons of
illegality.32 The third group questioned the interpretation of certain articles of
the contested acts in the event that the Court considered the prohibitions or
restrictions contained in the provisions to be valid.33 The referring court
justified its decision to seek clarification from the ECJ with the need to
provide a uniform interpretation of the provisions at stake in the proceedings,
which acknowledged the variations in the practices of the Member State
national authorities in relation to the meaning of such provisions.34
27. These are Arts. 1(2)(b) to (d) and 1(3), 4, 4a and 7 of the contested Decision and Annex
III to this act, naming Rosneft amongst the addressees of restrictive measures.
28. Arts. 4, 4a of Decision 2014/512 and Arts. 3, 3a, 4(3) and (4) of, and Annex II to,
Regulation 833/2014.
29. Arts. 1(2)(b) to (d) and 1(3) of, and Annex III to, Decision 2014/512 and Arts. 5(2)(b)
to (d), 5(3) of, and Annex VI to, Regulation 833/2014.
30. Art. 7 of Decision 2014/512 and Art. 11 of Regulation 833/2014.
31. EU-Russia PCA, O.J. 1997, L 327/1.
32. I.e: breach of the duty to state reasons; in addition, incompatibility of specific
provisions of the contested acts relating to the oil sector with the principle of equal treatment;
Council misuse of its power in adopting them; conflict with principle of proportionality, with
the freedom to conduct one’s business and the right to property; failure of Regulation 833/2014
to give proper effect to Decision 2014/512; lack of clarity of the obligation to impose penalties
by Member States for the breach of the content of the Regulation is contrary to the principles of
legal certainty and nulla poena sine lege certa.
33. The doubts concern the meaning of “financial assistance” (Art. 4(3) of the Regulation),
the scope of the prohibition of Art. 5 and the terms “shale” and “waters deeper than 150 meters”
mentioned in the CFSP Decision and in the Regulation. Since this part of the ruling does not
present special interest, no reference will be made to it in the summary of the case.
34. It is clear that the national court was very much aware of the fact that whereas there are
no limitations to the Court’s competence on the interpretation and validity of a regulation, even
if adopted in strict connection with a CFSP act, the grounds for its competence to interpret a
decision, setting up restrictive measures, falling within Chapter 2 of Title V TEU, are less solid
in the light of the letter of Art. 275(2) TFEU. The latter merely refers to “review of legality” of
the CFSP acts providing for restrictive measures and does not explicitly envisage a competence
to interpret these provisions. This is why almost all the interpretative questions concern the
Regulation rather than the CFSP act.
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3. Opinion ofAdvocate General Wathelet
Advocate General Wathelet’s answer to the first (and most important)
question raised by the referring court was that the EU judiciary could review
the compliance with Article 40 TEU of all CFSP acts (either in an action for
annulment or in preliminary ruling proceedings) as well as the legality of
CFSP Decisions which provide for restrictive measures against natural or
legal persons, again both in actions based on Article 263 and in those based on
Article 267 TFEU.35
In defining the scope and limits of the competence to review CFSP acts,
Advocate General Wathelet referred to the “grands arrêts” of the ECJ as well
as to Articles 24 TEU and 275 TFEU. Reference was made to Les Verts36
(which famously stressed that the Treaty creates a complete system of legal
remedies and procedures administered by the Court), and also to Foto-Frost.37
On the basis of Elitaliana,38 it was demonstrated that the ECJ’s lack of
competence in the sphere of the CFSP was an exception to its general
competence under Article 19 TEU and, as such, the exception should be
interpreted narrowly. However, most of the Opinion focuses on the wording of
the “carve-out”39 provisions of the Treaty, setting out the immunity from
jurisdiction in the area of the CFSP and the “clawback”40 provisions, defining
the exceptions to the lack of jurisdiction. Advocate General Wathelet sought
to identify a rule that would define the limits of the Court’s jurisdiction, not
only with respect to decisions setting up restrictive measures but, more
broadly, to all CFSP acts producing legally binding effects.
Advocate General Wathelet claimed that the immunity from jurisdiction
applied only to a CFSP act whose legal basis lies between Articles 23 and 46
TEU, and “its substantive content . . . falls within the sphere of CFSP
implementation.”41 In other words, it is not enough for an act to have its legal
basis in the CFSP Treaty provisions to therefore fall outside the scope of the
ECJ’s jurisdiction. For Advocate General Wathelet, the clawback provisions
should be interpreted keeping in mind the rationale behind excluding such
jurisdiction: “CFSP acts are, in principle, solely intended to translate
decisions of a purely political nature connected with the implementation of the
35. Para 65.
36. Case 294/83, Les Verts, EU:C:1986:166.
37. Case 314/85, Foto-Frost.
38. Case C-439/13 P, Elitaliana.
39. Art. 24(1)(2) TEU and Art. 275(1) TFEU.
40. The last sentence of Art. 24(1)(2) TEU and Art. 275(2) TFEU.
41. Opinion, para 49. The implication of the test identified by the A.G. to define the scope
of the immunity from jurisdiction is that regulations adopted by the Council on the basis of
Art. 215 TFEU fall outside the ambit of the “carve-out” provision.
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CFSP, in relation to which it is difficult to reconcile judicial review with the
separation of power.”42 The clawback provisions deprive CFSP acts of their
immunity from ECJ oversight where they go beyond the bounds of the
provisions of Title V, Chapter 2 of the Treaty. These Treaty Articles have not
substantially altered the position from that which existed before the adoption
of the Lisbon Treaty;43 indeed, Article 47 EC also enabled the Court to patrol
the borders between CFSP acts and other areas of law, although the clause was
drafted so as to favour the choice of first pillar measures over second pillar
ones, unlike Article 40 TEU.
Subsequently, the Advocate General analysed the ECJ’s specific
competence regarding decisions providing for restrictive measures. He noted
that while the two clawback provisions were worded in the same way as far as
the competence under Article 40 TEU was concerned, this was not the case in
the second exception to immunity. More precisely, according to Article 275(2)
TFEU, the Court has jurisdiction “to rule on proceedings, brought in
accordance with the conditions laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article
263 of this Treaty, reviewing the legality of decisions providing for restrictive
measures against natural or legal persons adopted by the Council on the basis
of Chapter 2 of Title V of the Treaty on European Union” (emphasis added).
Thus, this strand of the Court’s limited competence in the sphere of the CFSP
is defined in narrower terms than in the last sentence of Article 24(1)(2)
TEU.44 Article 275 seems to limit the possibility of challenging the legality of
restrictive measures by non-State actors to direct actions, as well as implicitly
excluding the competence to rule on these measures in the context of a
preliminary ruling procedure.Yet, there is well-established case law providing
authority to argue that the “review of legality mentioned in the last sentence of
the second subparagraph of Article 24(1) TEU includes not only actions for
annulment brought on the basis of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU,
but also, and in particular, the preliminary ruling procedure provided for in
Article 267 TFEU.”45 In Foto-Frost, it is recognized that: “Requests for
preliminary rulings, like actions for annulment, constitute means for
reviewing the legality of acts of the [European Union] institutions.”46 Further
support for this conclusion is drawn from a textual analysis of the Treaty
provisions dealing with the Court’s jurisdiction:
42. Opinion, para 52.
43. Opinion, para 56.
44. Indeed, this provision merely refers to “review of the legality of certain decisions as
provided for by the second paragraph of Art. 275 TFEU” (emphasis added).
45. Opinion, para 62.
46. Opinion, para 16.
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“… The ‘carve-out’ provision introduced by the first paragraph of Article
275 TFEU must, like any derogation, be interpreted narrowly, and since
the scope of the ‘clawback’ provision cannot be broader than that of the
‘carve-out’ provision, . . . the ‘clawback’ provision in the second
paragraph of Article 275 TFEU, which re-establishes the basic rule, must
be interpreted broadly, with account being taken of the broader terms of
the last sentence of the second subparagraph of Article 24(1) TEU.”47
A further point supporting the Advocate General’s view is that the refusal to
recognize a competence to give preliminary rulings in relation to any CFSP
act48 would be difficult to reconcile with Article 23 TEU, which provides that
“the Union’s action on the international scene . . . shall be guided by the
principles . . . laid down in Chapter 1, which include the rule of law and the
universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental
freedoms, . . . which unquestionably include the right of access to a court and
effective legal protection”.49
A separate section of the Advocate General’s Opinion was dedicated to the
Court’s competence to interpret CFSP acts, which appears to be excluded by
the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU. He convincingly argued that
preliminary rulings on interpretation can be given with respect to restrictive
measures.50
The Opinion also discussed whether the provisions of the contested CFSP
Decision actually fall within the category of “decisions providing for
restrictive measures against natural or legal persons.” Advocate General
Wathelet gave a positive answer with respect to the challenge against Articles
1(2)(b) to (d) and (3), and 7, given that Rosneft, listed in Annex III, comes
within their scope of application. He criticized the position of the General
Court in Sina Bank51 andHemmati,52 because in these judgments the concept
of “restrictive measure against natural/legal persons” is blended with the
criterion of being “individually concerned” by the measure in question.53 He
found such an interpretation incompatible with that of a different Chamber of
the General Court in National Iranian Oil Company.54 There, it was
47. Opinion, para 64.
48. As supported by A.G. Kokott in her View in Opinion 2/13, and also by the UK, Czech,
German, Estonian, French and Polish Governments and by the Council in the case at hand.
49. Opinion, para 66.
50. See for further comments section 5.8.2. infra.
51. Case T-67/12, Sina Bank, EU:T:2014:348.
52. Case T-68/12, Hemmati, EU:T:2014:349.
53. Opinion, para 90.
54. Case T-578/12, National Iranian Oil Company v. Council, EU:T:2014:678, confirmed
by the ECJ in its judgment Case C-440/14 P, National Iranian Oil Company.
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recognized that “the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU confers on all
natural and legal persons standing to institute proceedings against acts of the
EU institutions, provided that the conditions laid down in Article 263 TFEU
are fulfilled”, (emphasis added).55 Finally, the Advocate General rejected the
restrictive interpretation advanced by the Commission, the Council and the
Member States, since it would be incompatible with the system of judicial
protection instituted by the TFEU and the right to an effective legal remedy.
Additionally, it would render the “clawback” provision, in particular the
possibility of raising a preliminary ruling procedure on CFSP Decisions,
“chimeric in very many cases.”56
A negative answer was however given with respect to the Court’s
jurisdiction on Articles 4 and 4a of Decision 2014/512, for the reason that
these provisions do not refer to Rosneft. They cannot qualify as measures
containing restrictive measures against the Russian company, because they
fall outside the scope of Article 275(2) TFEU and thus cannot trigger the
Court’s competence to rule on their validity.57 This conclusion was based on
the General Court’s ruling in Kala Naft.58 Here, the challenge to Article 4 of
Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP,59 which did not specifically refer to the
applicant, was considered to fall outside the notion of “decision providing for
restrictive measures against natural or legal persons,” enshrined in Article
275(2) TFEU. Articles 4 and 4a of the contested Decision were considered
similar in wording to Article 4 of the 2010 Decision.60 In concluding this part,
Advocate General Wathelet took the view that the lack of competence of the
ECJ does not leave a legal gap in the EU system of judicial remedies since
the applicants may challenge the almost identically worded provisions of the
contested Regulation.61
Finally, the Advocate General turned to the substance of the contested acts.
In his view, the contested acts cannot qualify as legislative acts within the
meaning of Article 289(3) TFEU; they are enacted on the basis of a
non-legislative procedure. Since Rosneft did not allege that the contested
measures should have been adopted on any legal basis other than Articles 29
TEU and 215 TFEU, the (implicit) conclusion is that they are valid since they
do not affect the powers of the EU institutions in areas different from the CFSP,
55. Case T-578/12, National Iranian Oil Company, para 36.
56. Opinion, paras. 90–91.
57. Opinion, para 85.
58. Case T-509/10, Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft v. Council,
EU:T:2012:201.
59. Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP of 26 July 2010 concerning restrictive measures
against Iran and repealing Common Position 2007/140/CFSP, O.J. 2010, L 195/39.
60. Opinion, para 85.
61. Opinion, para 93.
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in breach of Article 40 TEU. The Opinion also rejected the other pleas of
invalidity, after a detailed analysis, with the exception of one: the second
subparagraph of Article 3(5) of Regulation 833/2014 was considered invalid
since it contradicts the contested CFSP Decision. The last part of the Opinion
was devoted to the interpretation of terms used in the contested Regulation,
while the contested CFSP Decision was not touched upon at all.
4. Judgment of the Court
4.1. Admissibility of the first question
According to the Council and the interveners,62 there was no need to raise a
question on the validity of the contested CFSP Decision; the dispute at
national level could be settled in the light of the contested Regulation only.The
ECJ rejected these arguments. After recalling the limited number of cases in
which a request for a preliminary ruling was held inadmissible, the Court
underlined that the first question had a direct connection to the subject matter
of the main proceedings. Its ruling on the validity of a CFSP Decision was
necessary because, if the ECJ found itself not competent to deal with the
matter, “it [would be] for the national court to ensure that there exist legal
remedies sufficient to ensure effective judicial protection.” This obligation
stemming from Article 19(1)(2) TEU also applies in the field of CFSP. In
addition, limiting the ECJ’s legal analysis to the validity of the Regulation
would have provided “inadequate answers to the concerns of the national
court.”63 A further point was that such an act is based on a CFSP Decision, and
the validity of the latter is a prerequisite for that of the former. Finally, the last
justification was that even if a regulation is declared invalid, this has no legal
effects on the obligation of Member States to ensure that their national policies
conform to the restrictive measures of the contested CFSP Decision. We
return to the possibility of reviewing the Regulation in lieu of the CFSP act in
the comments below.64
4.2. Substance of the first question
In relation to the substance of the first question, a number of interveners65
sided with the Council in holding that the EU judiciary did not have
62. The Estonian and Polish Governments and the Council.
63. Judgment, para 53.
64. See section 5.3. infra.
65. UK, Czech Republic, Estonia, France and Poland.
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jurisdiction to rule on the validity of the contested Decision. By contrast, the
Commission took the position that a preliminary ruling on the aforementioned
act was not precluded by the Treaty provisions; nonetheless, the conditions66
as defined by Article 275 (2) TFEU were not satisfied. The ECJ considered
that the question referred by the national court required clarification of two
issues: whether its jurisdiction could be exercised in the context of a
preliminary ruling procedure under Articles 40 TEU and 275(2) TFEU.
4.2.1. The preliminary procedure as a means to exercise jurisdiction
under Article 40 TEU
In a single paragraph, the Grand Chamber recognized the Court’s jurisdiction
to give a preliminary ruling concerning the compliance of Decision 2014/512
with Article 40 TEU.67 The Treaties do not make provision for any particular
means by which such judicial monitoring is to be carried out. Therefore, the
general rule defining the ECJ’s jurisdiction was applicable; Article 19(3)(b)
TEU states that the EU judiciary gives preliminary rulings, at the request of
national courts or tribunals, on, inter alia, the validity of acts adopted by the
institutions of the European Union.
4.2.2. The preliminary ruling procedure as a means to control the legality
of CFSP Decisions providing for restrictive measures
The second issue, concerning the jurisdiction with respect to restrictive
measures, was more difficult. Although Article 275(2) TFEU seems to limit
the ECJ’s jurisdiction to review the legality of restrictive measures to
annulment actions – given the reference to the competence to rule “on
proceedings, brought in accordance with the conditions laid down in the
fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU”, contained in this provision – three
arguments were used to stretch it so as include the preliminary ruling
procedure on the validity of these measures. First, the task of carrying out such
a review of EU acts relies on two complementary judicial procedures that are
couched in a system of legal remedies which is complete. Recalling a
well-known dictum in the Francovich ruling,68 the Court further argued:
“It is inherent in that complete system of legal remedies and procedures
that persons bringing proceedings must, when an action is brought before
a national court or tribunal, have the right to challenge the legality of
66. These are: a) the applicant in the main proceedings must satisfy the conditions laid
down in Art. 263(4) TFEU; and b) the aim of the proceedings is to examine the legality of
restrictive measures against natural or legal persons.
67. Judgment, para 62.
68. Here the Court recognized that the principle of State liability was inherent in the system
of the Treaty. See Joined Cases C-6 & 9/90, Francovich and others, EU:C:1991:428.
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provisions contained in European Union acts on which a decision or
national measure adopted in respect of them is based, pleading the
invalidity of that decision or measure, in order that the national court or
tribunal, having itself no jurisdiction to declare such invalidity, consults
the Court on that matter by means of a reference for a preliminary ruling,
unless those persons unquestionably had the right to bring an action
against those provisions on the basis of Article 263 TFEU and failed to
exercise that right within the period prescribed.69”
The Court recalled the Foto-Frost principles: the preliminary ruling
procedures are intended to ascertain the validity of a measure and constitute,
like actions for annulment, a means to review the legality of EU acts. The
Court went on: “That essential characteristic of the system for judicial
protection in the European Union extends to the review of the legality of
decisions that prescribe the adoption of restrictive measures against natural or
legal persons within the framework of the CFSP.”70 Subsequently, the Court
signalled that Article 275(2) TFEU did not prevent the proposed
interpretation:
“Neither the EU Treaty nor the FEU Treaty indicates that an action for
annulment brought before the General Court, pursuant to the combined
provisions of Articles 256 and 263 TFEU, constitutes the sole means for
reviewing the legality of decisions providing for restrictive measures
against natural or legal persons, to the exclusion, in particular, of a
reference for a preliminary ruling on validity.”71
At this juncture, the Court had a closer look at the text of the last sentence of
Article 24(1)(2) TEU and Article 275(2) TFEU. They are drafted in such a
way as to allow the EU judiciary a comfortable margin of interpretation. It
argued that: “[They] determine not the type of procedure under which the
Court may review the legality of certain decisions, but rather the type of
decisions whose legality may be reviewed by the Court, within any procedure
that has as its aim such a review of legality.”72
Next, the Court emphasized the essential role played by the preliminary
ruling procedure in ensuring effective judicial protection, given that the
implementation of a decision providing for restrictive measures against
69. Judgment, para 35.
70. Judgment, para 69.
71. Judgment, para 70.
72. Ibid.
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natural or legal persons falls on the Member States.The fact that the latter have
an obligation to comply with the Union position, enshrined in Council
decisions, makes access to judicial review of those acts indispensable for
natural or legal persons targeted by restrictive measures.
The Grand Chamber then turned to the EU’s founding values, with
particular focus on the rule of law. These are recalled in the common
provisions of the EU Treaty and are referred to, albeit more obliquely, as
guiding principles of the Union (when it is involved in actions on the
international stage) in Article 23 TEU defining the common principles of the
EU external action. The principle of effective judicial review, as embodied in
Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, was invoked to support
the interpretation that the exclusion of the ECJ’s jurisdiction in the CFSP
should be interpreted restrictively.73 It was argued that excluding the
possibility that courts and tribunals of Member States may use Article 267
TFEU to question the validity of Council Decisions as envisaged in Article
275(2) TFEU would conflict with the tasks assigned to the Court by Article
19(1) TEU and with the principle of effective judicial protection. Given that
the ECJ has jurisdiction ratione materiae over CFSP Decisions providing for
restrictive measures, it would be inconsistent with the “system of effective
judicial protection74” established by the Treaties to interpret the latter
provision as excluding the possibility that the courts and tribunals of Member
States may refer questions to the Court on the validity of Council decisions
prescribing the adoption of such measures.
The Court, drawing once again on the ratio decidendi of Foto-Frost,
explained that the necessary coherence of the system of judicial protection
requires that when the validity of acts of the EU institutions is raised before a
national court or tribunal, the power to declare such acts invalid should be
reserved to the Court under Article 267 TFEU.75 The same conclusion was
imperative with respect to decisions in the field of CFSP where the Treaties
confer jurisdiction on the Court to review their legality. Finally, the idea that
national courts can rule on the validity of CFSP Decisions was rejected on the
ground that the ECJ is better placed than national courts to perform such a
task. Indeed, it is open to the ECJ, within the preliminary ruling procedure, on
the one hand, to obtain the observations of Member States and the institutions
of the Union whose acts are challenged; and, on the other, to request that the
mentioned entities, bodies or agencies of the Union which are not parties to
73. Judgment, para 75. The Court is very much aware of the limits posed by the principle of
conferral, though. Para 74 starts: “… admittedly, Art. 47 of the Charter cannot confer
jurisdiction on the Court . …”
74. Judgment, para 76.
75. Judgment, para 78.
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the proceedings provide all the information that it considers necessary for the
purposes of the case before it.76
An additional reason to centralize control of the assessment of the validity
of CFSP Decisions was that “a different interpretation would be liable to
jeopardize the very unity of the European Union legal order and to undermine
the fundamental requirement of legal certainty.”77
4.3. Substance of the second question: The relation between the CFSP
Decision and the Regulation on the basis of Article 215 TFEU and the
discussion on “legislative measures” in the area of CFSP
The second group of questions listed a number of grounds for the invalidity of
the selected provisions of the contested measures.78 The most interesting one
concerns the breach of Article 40 TEU. Rosneft considered that the Council
infringed the non-affectation clause for two reasons: first, by adopting
Decision 2014/512, the EU position on the restrictive measures at issue in the
main proceedings was defined with excessive detail, thereby encroaching on
the powers of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy and the Commission, as provided for by Article 215(1) TFEU.
Second, the contested Decision may be qualified as a legislative measure
while the adoption of legislative acts is excluded by the Treaty in this field.
The Court rejected both arguments, taking the view that, first of all,
targeted restrictive measures are clearly technical in nature (they concern
access to capital markets, defence, dual-use goods and sensitive technologies,
particularly in the energy sector). The Council enjoys a broad discretion in
determining the persons and entities to be sanctioned. Article 215 TFEU, the
legal basis for the contested Regulation, serves as a bridge between the
objectives of the EU Treaty in CFSP matters and the actions of the Union
involving economic measures falling within the scope of the TFEU. Such an
act also ensures their uniform application across all Member States. The ECJ
acknowledged that the two acts have different functions; however, the fact that
the Decision describes in detail the persons and entities subject to the
restrictive measures could not, as a general rule, be regarded as encroaching
on the procedure laid down in Article 215 TFEU for the implementation of
that Decision. In particular, when the measures relate to a field where there is
a degree of technicality,79 it may prove appropriate for the Council to use
detailed wording when establishing restrictive measures. In such
76. Judgment, para 79.
77. Judgment, para 80.
78. Judgment, paras. 28–30.
79. Judgment, para 90.
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circumstances, this institution could not be criticized for having
predetermined, by the adoption of Decision 2014/512, part of the content of
Regulation 833/2014.
The ECJ rejected the argument that Article 40 TEU was breached because
the impugned Decision constituted a “legislative act”, while the adoption of
legislative acts is prohibited by Article 24(1) TEU. The Court based this
finding on the fact that according to Article 289(3) TFEU, legal acts adopted
by legislative procedure constitute legislative acts. It added that the exclusion
of the right to adopt legislative acts in the area of the CFSP “reflects the
intention that that policy should be subject to specific rules and procedures as
it is clear from Article 24 TEU”.80 The other arguments raised against the
validity of contested acts were also considered to be unfounded.81
5. Comment
5.1. An audacious judgment making CFSP, almost, but not quite, perfect
These comments focus on the ECJ’s answers to the admissibility and
substance of the first and second group of questions.82
First of all, it may be observed that there are many similarities between the
Advocate General’s Opinion and the Grand Chamber ruling. Both of them
give a positive answer to the first question, concerning the competence to rule
on the validity of a CFSP Decision, on condition that the request for
preliminary ruling concerns respect of Article 40 TEU or one of the
mentioned acts providing for restrictive measures against natural and legal
persons. Thus, the national court may raise doubts on whether the contested
CFSP Decision went beyond the sphere of foreign affairs and thus breached
Article 40TEU. It is also possible to ask for a preliminary ruling on the validity
of the inclusion of Rosneft in the list of operators of Annex III of the contested
CFSP Decision, given that such an Annex is part of that act.
The ECJ followed Advocate General Wathelet’s position in declaring itself
not competent to review the legality of certain of the so-called “oil sector
provisions” (Arts. 4 and 4a) of the impugned Decision. The reasons are
80. Judgment, para 91.
81. These are the breach of the EU-Russia PCA, and of a number of obligations, including
respecting fundamental rights.
82. The remainder of the judgment (paras. 108–196) will not form the object of any
comments.
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similar.83 Finally, on the substance, Advocate General Wathelet and the ECJ
concur in holding that the contested acts were not affected by invalidity.84
The most important difference between the Opinion and the judgment
concerns the competence to interpret a CFSP Decision, which was admitted
by the Advocate General, whereas the ECJ did not approach this issue.85 The
interpretation techniques are also different: Advocate General Wathelet based
himself on the wording of the Treaty provisions86 whereas the core of the
Court’s ruling was based on the principle of effective judicial protection.
The ECJ judgment sheds light on the boundaries of its limited jurisdiction
in CFSP matters:87 the Court interpreted its competence to examine the
legality of restrictive measures widely and made clear that its power of review
in this area is subject to the same principles as those applicable to non-CFSP
areas. In earlier cases, particularly Segi,88 the Court also provided a wide
interpretation of the right to make a reference to the ECJ for a preliminary
ruling with respect to common positions.89 However, in Rosneft the Grand
Chamber was even more audacious than in Segi concerning counter-terrorist
sanctions: whereas former Article 35(1) TEU provided for the competence of
the Court to rule on the interpretation and validity of selected third pillar acts
in the context of the preliminary rulings, Article 275 TFEU did not explicitly
envisage the possibility of using that remedy.90
Given that the ECJ has interpreted the scope of the CFSP extensively (also
to the detriment of the provisions of the area of freedom, security and
justice),91 the wide interpretation of the means available to control the legality
83. Judgment, paras. 95–99 and Opinion paras. 81–85.
84. However, there is a difference between the position of A.G. Wathelet and that of the
Court. In comparing the wording of Art. 4(4) of Decision 2014/512 and Art. 3(5) of Regulation
833/2014,A.G. Wathelet found that the act based upon Art. 215 (2)TFEU is invalid whereas the
Court confirms its validity.
85. However, this difference may be a minor one considering that it would be impossible to
rule on the validity of the contested act without interpreting it.
86. Sometimes, it is not easy to recognize the interpretation technique used by A.G.
Wathelet to achieve his conclusions. For example, it is not clear in para 64 of his Opinion why
the exception to the exception to the immunity from jurisdiction for the CFSP provisions should
be construed broadly.
87. Opinion 2/13, ECHR, EU:C:2014:2454, para 251.
88. This case concerned sanctions with a counter-terrorism purpose falling at the time of
this ruling within the third pillar. C-355/04 P, Segi and others, EU:C:2007:116.
89. Ibid., para 54.
90. This point was made by the French Government in Opinion 2/13, see para 134.
91. The ruling of the ECJ on the EU-Tanzania Agreement (Case C-263/14 P, Parliament v.
Council, EU:C:2016:435) is the last example of this judicial trend (see also Case C-658/11,
Parliament v. Council, EU:C:2014:2025). Here, the ECJ considered that the agreement in
question, enabling Member States to transfer pirates caught during the operation Atalanta to
Tanzania, in view of their prosecution, falls predominantly within the CFSP, despite its
containing clauses concerning the area of freedom, security and justice that could have justified
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of a subset of CFSP acts can be considered a welcome compensation. The
incursion of the EU judiciary into the CFSP, as a result of post-Lisbon case
law, is significant. In the judgment, the ECJ interpreted the provisions of the
Treaty limiting its jurisdiction in CFSP narrowly,92 in the name of the
principle of effective judicial protection. This adds to Elitaliana93 and H,94
which respectively concerned the legality of acts of an administrative nature
necessary to carry out the Eulex mission95 and that of a decision96 concerning
the management of staff seconded to an EU mission. These acts were thus
merely set in the “context of the CFSP.” In both those appeals, the ECJ
considered itself competent.97 The EU-Tanzania Agreement case98 is also
noteworthy in this context; here, the Court interpreted the exception to its lack
of jurisdiction with respect to the provisions of the EU Treaty related to the
CFSP as including its competence to monitor whether an international
agreement adopted to implement a CFSP act “does not impinge upon the
application of the procedures and the extent of the powers of the institutions
laid down by the Treaties for the exercise of the Union’s competences under
the FEU Treaty.”99 The ECJ is therefore empowered to verify whether Article
reliance on Arts. 82 and 87 TFEU in addition or instead of Art. 37 of TEU. The ECJ took the
view that such an agreement pursues the objectives of the operation Atalanta, set up to preserve
international peace and security, in particular by making it possible to ensure that the
perpetrators of acts of piracy do not go unpunished (para 54). An earlier notorious ruling is that
in Case C-130/10, Parliament v. Council, EU:C:2012:472. This time internal measures, in
particular, restrictive measures of UN origin, enacted for counter-terrorism purposes, are
deemed to fall within the CFSP. The Court excludes they can be based on Art. 75 TFEU,
concerned with the prevention of fighting of terrorism in the context of the provisions of the
AFSJ.
92. Case C-439/13 P,Elitaliana, para 49 and Case C-455/14 P,H. v.Council of the European
Union, paras. 55–59.
93. Ibid., Case C-439/13 P, Elitaliana.
94. Case C-455/14 P, H. v. Council, paras. 42–44. See the comments on this ruling by Van
Elsuwege, “Upholding the rule of law in the Common Foreign and Security Policy: H v.
Council,” 54 CML Rev. (2017), and Verellen, “H v. Council: Strengthening the rule of law in
the sphere of the CFSP, one step at a time,” (2016) EP, 1–13.
95. In particular, a decision to award a contract for a service necessary to the Eulex mission
as provided for by the rules of the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the
EU, including expenditures in the area of the CFSP. See Case C-439/13 P, Elitaliana, para 63.
96. In particular, a decision by national authority to re-locate a staff member seconded to the
EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
97. In Elitaliana the applicant’s annulment action was rejected by the General Court (Case
T-213/12, Elitaliana v. Eulex Kosovo, EU:T:2013:292) and the appeal against the General
Court’s order was upheld by the ECJ in Case C-439/13 P, Elitaliana.
98. Case C-263/14 P, Parliament v. Council.
99. Ibid., para 42.
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40 TEU was breached by the EU Agreement at stake. This was an important
decision of principle, although the Court could not review the concerned act
on the substance.
With its broad construction in Rosneft of judicial oversight of selected
CFSP acts, the ECJ does not empty the general rule on its lack of jurisdiction
with respect to CFSP measures (laid down in Article 24(1)(2) TEU) of all
content. Rather it applies principles stemming from its case law (and relating
to non-CFSP areas) to specific CFSP acts which fall within its competence
ratione materiae, as a result of the Treaty itself. In light of the
above-mentioned considerations, it is possible to argue that the Court
advanced the process of transition of this field towards the fuller integration
into the mainstream of European Union law”,100 while respecting the
boundaries of the competence conferred on this institution by the Treaty
drafters.
Yet, the CFSP is not fully part of the EU legal order as far as judicial review
is concerned: access to justice in this field is still limited; for instance, natural
and legal persons cannot challenge the so-called “oil sector provisions” of the
CFSP Decision impugned by the applicant in the present case; nor are
the CFSP acts, distinct from those imposing sanctions, generally subject to the
Court’s jurisdiction. For example, if an EU mission set up through a CFSP
Decision were to breach human rights, the ECJ could not examine the legality
of the EU’s action in the context of the Common Security and Defence
Policy,101 which is part of the CFSP. This area is therefore still lex
imperfecta.102 It may be concluded that the scope of judicial review in the area
remains limited and the exercise of EU powers in many areas of this sector
continues to be screened from judicial oversight. If the Commission were to
ask an Opinion under Article 218(11) TFEU on the EU’s accession to the
ECHR, as it did in 2013, the ECJ’s answer would still be that an accession
treaty cannot be concluded, insofar as the European Court of Human Rights
would be able to review CFSP acts which are not subject to the jurisdiction of
the ECJ.103
100. Gosalbo Bono, “Some reflections on the CFSP legal order,” 43 CML Rev. (2006),
337–394, at 394.
101. For a more detailed examination of this issue, see Øby Johansen, “Accountability
mechanisms for human rights violations by CSDP missions: Available and sufficient?,” (2017)
ICLQ, 181–207. See also Section 6 infra.
102. See A.G. Wahl’s Opinion in Case C-455/14 P, H., paras. 38–40.
103. On the characteristics of judicial review in CFSP matters see Opinion 2/13,
paras. 249–259.
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5.2. Domestic courts and their review of CFSP Decisions implementing a
UN Security Council Resolution in the light of Rosneft (ECJ) and
Al-Dulimi (ECtHR)
Notably, the Council Decision impugned inRosneft instituted autonomous EU
sanctions. However, there is no reason to believe that the outcome of the case
would have been different had the EU restrictive measures implemented a
United Nations Security Council (“UNSC”) resolution, obliging UN
members to freeze the assets of natural or legal persons. The need to provide
effective judicial protection, in a Union based on the rule of law, applies
equally to sanctions adopted in the UN context, given the absence of an
independent judicial review mechanism.104 If national courts in the EU doubt
the validity of the act providing for restrictive measures, they may refer a
question to the ECJ which will exercise its jurisdiction, following Rosneft.105
However, it is possible that domestic courts will give effect to the freezing
order and refuse to question the legality of the sanction, thus escaping the
ECJ’s review. In such a situation, the ECtHR could find that such a refusal
breaches Article 6(1) ECHR, as was the case in Al-Dulimi in 2016.106 In this
judgment, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR held that Switzerland violated
the right of access to a court because its judicial authorities refused to review
on the merits the national measure confiscating Mr Al Dulimi’s property, in
compliance with a UNSC resolution of 2003. The view of the ECtHR was that
the domestic court should have carried out a judicial review for the purpose of
avoiding arbitrary designations by the UNSC.107 The reasoning underlying the
104. See Joined Cases C-584, 593 & 595/10 P, Commission v. Kadi, EU:C:2013:518.
Autonomous sanctions and sanctions of UN origin are subject to the same standards of judicial
review as well as procedural standards, including the obligation to state reasons for the Council.
For an interesting case on this issue, see Case T-681/14,El-Qaddafi v.Council, EU:T:2017:227.
The GC confirmed that even if in an EU act the summary of reasons, justifying the inclusion in
the blacklist of a person, is motivated in identical terms to that of the UNSC resolution which
the concerned EU act must implement, the EU Council is not relieved of its obligation to
ascertain whether those reasons comply with the principles of the case law on Art. 296 TFEU
(see para 66).
105. The ECJ in Rosneft does not state in clear and unequivocal terms that domestic courts
are obliged to refer to the ECJ in case of doubts. The use of the terms “may refer” in para 76 and
the expression “should refer” (instead of “shall”) lead to the conclusion that domestic courts are
not obliged to turn to the ECJ.
106. ECtHR, Al-Dulimi and Montana management inc. v. Switzerland, Appl. No. 5809/08,
judgment of 21 June 2016. For insightful comments on Al-Dulimi and also on the
inconsistencies in the ECtHR’s case law on access to justice, see Peters, <www.ejiltalk.org/
the-new-arbitrariness-and-competing-constitutionalisms-remarks-on-ecthr-grand-chamber-al-
dulimi/>, (last visited 20 Aug. 2017).
107. InAl-Dulimi, Switzerland was found to breachArt. 6(1) ECHR since in 2008 the Swiss
Federal court refused to examine the merit of the action brought by a number of former officials
of the Iraqi Government against the confiscation of their properties, enacted by
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interpretation of Article 6(1) ECHR in Al Dulimi and the justification leading
the ECJ to assert its jurisdiction in Rosneft (in the light of Art. 47 of the EU
Charter of fundamental rights), is similar. On the one hand, for the ECtHR
access to justice must be made available to persons listed by a UNSC
resolution in order to avoid arbitrariness, since “[o]ne of the fundamental
components of European public order is the principle of the rule of law …”;108
the denial of any substantive review undermines “the very essence of the
applicant’s right of access to a court”.109 On the other hand, for the EU
judiciary, “any person whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by EU law are
violated should have the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in
compliance with the conditions laid down in [Art. 47 of the EU Charter]. It
must be recalled that the very existence of effective judicial review designed to
ensure compliance with provisions of EU law is of (sic) the essence of the rule
of law”.110 Although the Al Dulimi ruling concerns access to justice (Art. 6
ECHR) and not the right to an effective remedy (Art. 13 ECHR), which was at
stake in Rosneft, there are similarities in the language used by the two
Switzerland to implement a UNSC Resolution of 2003. The reason leading the domestic court
to take such a decision was that under Art. 103 of the UN Charter the obligations deriving from
the latter Treaty prevail over other those stemming from other sources of international law,
except for jus cogens. In addition, the UNSC resolution at stake did not leave any degree of
flexibility to national authorities. The ECtHR excluded that there was a conflict of obligations
between the UN Charter and the ECHR. There was no need to apply the equivalent protection
test. The examination of the text of the UNSC resolution led to conclusion that: “… where a
[UNSC] resolution …, does not contain any clear or explicit wording excluding the possibility
of judicial supervision of the measures taken for its implementation, it must always be
understood as authorizing the courts of the respondent State to exercise sufficient scrutiny so
that any arbitrariness can be avoided” (para 146). The ECtHR went on to state that: “Any State
Party whose authorities give legal effect to the addition of a person – whether an individual or
a legal entity – to a sanctions list, without first ensuring – or being able to ensure – that the listing
is not arbitrary will engage its responsibility under Art. 6 of the Convention.” See for a
comment, Tzevelekos, “The Al-Dulimi case before the Grand Chamber of the European Court
of Human Rights: Business as usual? Test of equivalent protection, (constitutional) hierarchy
and systemic integration,” 38 Questions of International Law (2017), 5–34.
108. Judgment, para 145.
109. Judgment, para 151.
110. Judgment, para 73. The reference to the rule of law emerges even more clearly in A.G.
Wathelet’s Opinion. He stresses that the refusal to recognize a competence to give preliminary
rulings in relation to any CFSP acts “would be difficult to reconcile with Art. 23 TEU, which
provides that ‘the Union’s action on the international scene . . . shall be guided by the
principles . . . laid down in Chapter 1, which include the rule of law and the universality and
indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, . . . which unquestionably include
the right of access to a court and effective legal protection” (para 66). It seems that Art. 47 of the
Charter, which is at the centre of the ECJ’s ruling, offers a more solid ground than Art. 23 TEU
(with its indirect link to the rule of law) to impose on the EU institutions respect of the principle
of effective judicial protection. For a different view on the importance of Art. 23 TEU, “which
forms the linchpin between the CFSP and the EU’s general principles and values,” see Van
Elsuwege, op. cit. supra note 94.
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courts.111 It is submitted that the legal avenues offered to individuals wishing
the challenge restrictive measures are therefore strengthened as a result of the
two rulings, and the ECJ and the ECtHR play complementary roles in
providing human rights scrutiny. Indeed, if an EU domestic court does not
question the validity of a CFSP decision implementing an UNSC resolution,
the victim of a possible breach of a right protected by the ECHR, may turn to
the ECtHR. It should be noted that from the perspective of an individual
affected by a CFSP decision imposing restrictive measures implementing a
UNSC resolution in an EU member State, it is preferable that a national court
starts a preliminary ruling procedure. The rule on the previous exhaustion of
domestic remedies, applicable in context of the ECHR,112 will inevitably
delay a judgment of the ECtHR, whereas in the EU, following Rosneft, all
national courts may raise a question on the validity of CFSP Decisions
providing for restrictive measures and they are likely to receive a relatively
prompt answer.113
5.3. Is the ECJ’s answer on the admissibility of the first question
convincing?
Could the ECJ have limited itself to ruling on the validity of the impugned
Regulation, considering that its competence was uncontested, without
tackling the problem of the legality of the CFSP Decision at all? This issue
was raised by several interveners,114 and the ECJ, unlike the Advocate
General, dwells on it at length. It is submitted, that in principle, the EU
judiciary could have ruled on the validity of the act adopted under Article 215
TFEU (the Regulation), given that this measure largely reflects the content of
the contested CFSP Decision. The Advocate General’s Opinion lends indirect
support for this position, making the point that if the impugned Regulation is
declared invalid, the Council would be required to take the necessary
measures to make the equivalent provisions of CFSP Decision compatible
111. It is striking that there is no reference to Al Dulimi in Rosneft. This absence may be
interpreted as meaning that the ECJ has chosen to give to Art. 47 of the Charter an interpretation
which is autonomous from that provided by the ECtHR with respect to Art. 6(1) or Art. 13
ECHR. For a discussion of the usefulness of Art. 47 of the EU Charter, see Lebrun, “De l’utilité
de l’art. 47 de la Chartre de droits fondamenteaux de l’Union européenne”, (2016) Revue
Trimestrielle de droits de l’homme, 433–459.
112. Art. 35(1) ECHR.
113. The High Court of England and Wales referred its questions to the ECJ on 9 Feb. 2015,
and the ECJ Rosneft judgment was given on 28 March 2017. The notion of effective judicial
protection entails also the notion of reasonably speedy protection. For this point, see Spaventa,
annotation of Case T-256/07, People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran v. Council, 46 CML
Rev. (2009), 1239–1263, at 1258.
114. Estonian and Polish Governments and the Council.
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with the Court’s judgment; this follows fromArticle 266 TFEU.115 His point is
convincing and it is regrettable that it is not reflected in the judgment. This
shows that, on the one hand, the ECJ did not wish to side-step the thorny issue
of the scope of the exception to the derogation from its general jurisdiction
with respect to decisions providing for restrictive measures, and that it
attached little importance to the fact that private parties could unquestionably
have challenged the validity of the Regulation. The Court emphasized the
reasons why it had to answer the question raised by the national court on its
competence to examine the validity of a CFSP Decision. Three points were
mentioned: first, the impossibility of challenging such an act would
undermine the fundamental right of access to justice; second, a prerequisite
for the validity of a regulation adopted under Article 215(2) TFEU is the prior
adoption of a valid CFSP Decision (which is why it was relevant for the
referring national judicial authority to ask the ECJ a question on the latter act
rather than the former one). These two arguments are generally convincing.As
a third argument, the Court stated that, even if the Regulation were to be
declared invalid, this can
“as a matter of principle, have no effect on the obligation of Member
States to ensure that their national policies conform to the restrictive
measures established pursuant to Decision 2014/512. Accordingly, to the
extent that the Court has jurisdiction to examine the validity of Decision
2014/512, such an examination is required in order to determine the scope
of the obligations resulting from that decision, irrespective of whether
Regulation 833/2014 is valid.”116
This argument is not easy to grasp. The ECJ undermines the idea that if the
Regulation is illegal, such illegality also taints the CFSP Decision. In addition,
the fact that CFSP decisions are binding for Member States does not explain
why it is necessary for the Court to determine the scope of the obligations laid
down by them, in the absence of a competence to interpret them.
An additional argument supporting the Court’s first two justifications is
that it is not always possible to challenge a regulation. For example, the
provisions of a CFSP Decision setting up admission restrictions are
implemented at national level. There are no acts whose legality could be
questioned by the addressees of such measures. These persons would have to
go to national courts and attack the denial of entry in the territory of the
Member State concerned. Since it would not have been possible to contest
the validity of the CFSP Decision providing for the restrictive measure, the
115. Opinion, para 93.
116. Judgment, para 56.
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national court concerned would have had to take the final decision without
being able to consult the ECJ. In consideration of the impossibility to
challenge all aspects of regulations, it may be concluded that the decision to
answer the first preliminary ruling question is welcome.
5.4. The scope of the ECJ’s limited jurisdiction: The strengthening of the
position of individuals as subjects of restrictive measures
These comments now address the ECJ’s reasoning in order to define the scope
of its jurisdiction under Article 275(2) TFEU. As regards the jurisdiction to
monitor compliance with Article 40 TEU, the Treaty provisions are
sufficiently open to support the interpretation that the Court’s task can be
performed through all legal remedies available in the Treaty. It is therefore
straightforward to recognize a competence under Article 267 TFEU on the
basis of a literal interpretation of the Treaty.117 The exceptional circumstances
in which the ECJ can rule in the area of the CFSP are set out in Articles 24(1)
TEU and 275(2)TFEU. Where a rationemateriae competence exists and there
are no limitations in the Treaty as to the kind of procedures which may be used
in order for the Court to carry out its tasks, this must mean that this institution
is free to use all the remedies at its disposal.There was little doubt that the ECJ
could make full use of its powers to police the boundaries between CFSP and
non-CFSP acts.
There were a number of hurdles to overcome, however, in order to interpret
the relevant Treaty provisions in support of its competence to make
preliminary rulings on the validity of restrictive measures. Indeed, Article
275(2) specifies that the Court has jurisdiction: “… to rule on proceedings,
brought in accordance with the conditions laid down in the fourth paragraph
of Article 263 of this Treaty, reviewing the legality of decisions providing for
restrictive measures against natural and legal persons …” (our emphasis
added); this means that the Court is competent to assess the legality of those
Decisions in a specific type of procedure, namely, annulment actions. Had the
Treaty drafters meant to include the preliminary ruling procedure, arguably
they would have drafted Article 275(2) TFEU as follows: “to rule on
proceedings reviewing the legality of decisions providing for restrictive
measures against natural and legal persons.” However, this argument is not
sufficient to exclude the preliminary ruling procedure from the notion of
117. The General Court has also recognized this competence: “It is only on an exceptional
basis that, under the second paragraph of Art. 275 TFEU, the Courts of the European Union are
to have jurisdiction in matters relating to the CFSP. That jurisdiction includes review of whether
Art. 40 TEU has been complied with . …” (emphasis added). Case T-328/14, Jannathian v.
Council, EU:T:2016:86, para 30.
Case C-72/15 1821
“review of legality”. In fact, one could also argue that, had the Treaty drafters
wanted to exclude this particular competence, they would have made the
exclusion explicit. This is all the more convincing since the expression
“review of legality”, in Article 275(2), encompasses both annulment actions
and the preliminary ruling procedure, as has also been stressed by legal
scholars.118
The Court is right to hold that Articles 24(1) TEU and 275(1) TFEU do not
determine the type of procedure under which the EU judicature may review
the legality of certain decisions, but rather the type of decisions whose legality
may be controlled by the Court. Opening up the possibility of asking for a
preliminary ruling in the name of the right to an effective judicial protection is
convincing. The same holds for arguments supporting the position that the
ECJ is better placed than domestic courts to assess the validity of those
measures.119 By contrast with classic CFSP Decisions, establishing the
position of the EU on a certain thematic or geographic issue and thus affecting
the position of third countries, individual sanctions touch directly upon the
rights of non-State actors. In a system of remedies such as that on which the
EU is founded, these measures should be subject to judicial review, either in
direct or indirect actions. Therefore, there is no logical reason to allow
applicants to challenge sanctions in annulment actions but not in preliminary
ruling procedures, once the political choice is made to provide non-State
actors with the opportunity to contest the legality of CFSP Decisions. By
enabling private applicants to contest restrictive measures, the Lisbon Treaty
contributed to turning non-State actors from objects to subjects of EU law.120
The ECJ has now simply reinforced their position as litigants in relation to
restrictive measures. It has been suggested that “it should now be up to the
118. Hillion, “A powerless Court? The European Court of Justice and the Common Foreign
and Security Policy”, available at <ssrn.com/abstract=2388165>, (last visited 15 June 2017);
Tridimas, “The European Court of Justice and the draft constitution: A supreme Court for the
Union?”, in Tridimas and Nebbia (Eds.), European Union Law for the Twenty-First Century:
Rethinking the New Legal Order,Vol. 1 (Hart Publishing, 2004), p. 128.
119. It should be noted that since the Court will be able to have access to “all information
that the Court considers necessary for the purposes of the case before it” this may imply that the
Council will be able to provide the ECJ with confidential information without disclosing it to
the other party, as a result of the new rules of procedure of the General Court and the ECJ (see
Art. 105 of the Rule of procedure of the General Court and Art. 190a of the Rules of procedure
of the ECJ). This entails that legal and natural persons targeted by restrictive measures and
wishing to challenge them may not necessarily benefit from the fact that the ECJ will have
access to “all the information available.”
120. Although they do not have all legal remedies at their disposal as any other subject of
EU law wishing to challenge a non-CFSP measure. For further thoughts on this, see Poli, “The
turning of non-State entities from objects to subjects of EU restrictive measures,” in Fahey and
Bardutzky (Eds.) Framing the Subjects and Objects of EU Law (Edward Elgar, 2017),
pp. 158–181.
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Member States to reflect the clarification of the Court of the Justice in the
Treaty.”121 However, since the Court has simply clarified the wording of the
Treaties, it is probably not necessary to change primary law.
5.5. The relationship between the annulment action and the plea of
illegality
Given the Court’s competence to review CFSP Decisions of the kind at stake
in Rosneft, in the context both of an annulment action and a preliminary ruling
procedure, it is necessary to examine how TWD122 (which limits the latter
remedy, depending on the standing of the applicants under Art. 263 TFEU)
operates in the context of challenges to restrictive measures. The TWD ruling
enables a private applicant to plea the illegality of an act of a general nature,
even if he has not brought an annulment action against the measure in question
within the available time limit, provided that it is uncertain that he would have
had standing to challenge such a measure in an annulment action.123 Is the plea
of illegality available to natural or legal persons only if they have previously
submitted an action for annulment before the General Court, or also where
they have not done so, provided it is not undisputed that they would have
standing to directly challenge the CFSP Decision? The ECJ did not tackle this
issue directly in Rosneft. In fact, the Russian company had first brought an
annulment action before the General Court124 and had later sought judicial
review at national level primarily against the national legislation imposing
criminal penalties for breach of the restrictive measures. The ECJ’s judgment
supports the view that an applicant like Rosneft was required to bring a prior
annulment action before the General Court,125 since it is clear that it had
standing to challenge the CFSP Decision. This interpretation finds an indirect
confirmation in A and others, given 14 days before Rosneft, which concerned
the inclusion of the Tamil Tigers on a list of entities subject to
121. An advocate of this solution is Verellen, op. cit. supra note 94, 12.
122. Case C-188/92, TWD Textilwerke Deggendorf, EU:C:1994:90.
123. Ibid., para 17. This principle continues to be relevant after the entry into force of the
Treaty of Lisbon. See A.G. Sharpston’s Opinion in Case C-158/14, A and others,
EU:C:2016:734, para 68.
124. See Section 2 supra.
125. Judgment, para 67: “… persons bringing proceedings must, when an action is brought
before a national court or tribunal, have the right to challenge the legality of provisions
contained in European Union acts on which a decision or national measure adopted in respect
of them is based, pleading the invalidity of that decision or measure, in order that the national
court or tribunal . . . consults the Court on that matter by means of a reference for a preliminary
ruling, unless those persons unquestionably had the right to bring an action against those
provisions on the basis of Art. 263 TFEU and failed to exercise that right within the period
prescribed” (emphasis added).
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counter-terrorism sanctions, where the Court stated that: “a request for a
preliminary ruling concerning the validity of an act of the European Union can
be dismissed only in the event that, although the action for annulment of an act
of the European Union would unquestionably have been admissible, the
natural or legal person capable of bringing such an action abstained from
doing so within the prescribed period and is pleading the unlawfulness of that
act in national proceedings in order to encourage the national court to submit
a request for a preliminary ruling to the ECJ concerning the validity of that act,
thereby circumventing the fact that that act is final as against him once the
time limit for his bringing an action has expired” (emphases added).126
Combining Rosneft and A and others, it is possible to argue that a
preliminary ruling on the validity of a CFSP Decision is admissible only if the
addressee of a restrictive measure, who has standing to directly challenge that
measure, has previously sought to impugn such an act within the prescribed
time limit. The implication of the two cases is that natural and legal persons
identified by a CFSP decision will have an incentive both to apply for the
annulment of the contested measure before the General Court and to make use
of the preliminary ruling to question the validity of a CFSP measure. The
General Court will, most likely, suspend its ruling, pending the ECJ’s reply, as
it did in Rosneft.127 By contrast, whenever natural and legal persons are not
sure whether they would have standing to question the legality of a CFSP
measure in an annulment action, they will most likely seek justice at a national
level hoping that the national court has doubts on the validity of the CFSP act
and decides to refer the case in the context of a plea of illegality, which the
Court will consider admissible. As a result of this state of the law, the EU
judiciary will see an increase in its case load on restrictive measures due to the
rise in number of actions under Articles 267 and 277 TFEU.
5.6. The narrow interpretation of “restrictive measures against natural
and legal persons”
In Rosneft, the Court gives a narrow reading of the provisions of a CFSP
Decision providing for restrictive measures whose legality may be questioned
by natural and legal persons: only the provisions of a CFSP Decision
individually concerning the applicant can be challenged. This position does
not sit comfortably alongside the preliminary ruling in A and others, enabling
126. Case C-158/14, A and others. para 70.
127. By order of 26 March 2015, the President of the Ninth Chamber of the General Court
stayed the proceedings in Case T-715/14, pursuant to Art. 54(3) of the Statute of the ECJ and
Art. 77(a) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court of 2 May 1991, pending delivery of
the judgment in the preliminary ruling.
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private parties to challenge the validity of the provisions of a CFSP Decision
providing for restrictive measures against a designated terrorist group, despite
the fact that they were not listed by that act.
The Court states in Rosneft that: “By establishing the criteria laid down in
Article 1(2)(b) to (d) of Decision 2014/512, allowing the identification of
Rosneft, and by naming that company in Annex III to that decision, the
Council adopted restrictive measures against the legal person concerned.… If
the legality of these measures is challenged, it must be possible for those
measures to be subject . . . to judicial review.”128 Here, the Court recognizes
that it is the individual nature of the Decision providing for restrictive
measures against natural and legal persons that enables the latter to contest the
concerned act even in the context of a preliminary ruling. This issue was
raised for the first time, before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, with
respect to regulations in Kadi I129 and with respect to Council Decisions in
Gbagbo.130 Later, in the Sina Bank131 and Hemmati132 rulings the General
Court applied the same interpretation.
Therefore, if the challenged provisions of the measures are applicable
generally to all operators involved in the sale, supply, transfer or export of
certain technologies, as in the case of the prohibitions contained in Articles 4
and 4a of Decision 2014/512, Rosneft, as well as the other companies, coming
within the scope of the mentioned act, lack locus standi to challenge them.The
justification is that these provisions do not constitute “restrictive measures
against natural and legal persons” within the meaning of Article 275(2)TFEU,
but rather measures of general application.133
Thus, only if the applicant falls within the scope ratione personae of the
restrictive measures and is listed in annexes of the CFSP Decision, does a
sanction against a natural and legal person fall within the definition of Article
275(2) and may be subject to judicial review. In contrast, private parties cannot
bring an action against the provisions of the Decision that identify the target by
reference to objective criteria and are applicable generally. The implication is
that the ECJ cannot review the provisions of the CFSP Decision that
determine in an abstract and general manner a category of persons and impose
on them a trade ban or restriction, not even if the listed persons are those
directly affected by these measures. This exclusion is based on a narrow
reading of the expression “restrictive measures against natural and legal
128. Judgment, para 104.
129. Joined Cases C-402 & 415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v.
Council and Commission, EU:C:2008:461, paras. 241–244.
130. Case C-488/11 P, Gbagbo, EU:C:2013:258, para 57.
131. Case T-67/12, Sina Bank.
132. Case T-68/12, Hemmati.
133. Judgment, para 98.
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persons” enshrined in Article 275 TFEU and is not supported by any apparent
justifications. Hence, the power to review CFSP Decisions providing for
restrictive measures vis-a-vis non-State actors has a limit that the Court has set
for itself; it is not imposed by the wording of the relevant Treaty provision. As
Rosas reminds us, “judicial review contributes to keeping sanction decisions
especially those against private persons and companies within reasonable
limits, in other words that they are not taken in a completely arbitrary
haphazard and disproportionate manner.”134 However, this is only possible if
private parties have access to justice.135 In the light of this, it may be thought
that natural and legal persons should be able to seek judicial review before the
ECJ whenever they are listed and are affected by the provisions of the
Decision, in parallel with the second paragraph of Article 263(4) TFEU.
The Court could of its own motion interpret Article 275(2) TFEU in such a
manner.
Furthermore, the Grand Chamber’s position on the inadmissibility of
Rosneft’s challenge of Articles 4 and 4a of the Decision is not easily
reconcilable with the ruling in A and others,136 concerning a sanction enacted
in order to combat terrorist organizations. Under the latter judgment, it is
possible for persons not listed by a restrictive measure to challenge the act
providing for such measures via the preliminary ruling procedure, despite the
fact that they were not included in the list of targeted persons. If third parties
can contest the legality of restrictive measures, why then, can Rosneft, which
is listed in the contested Decision, not impugn an export prohibition that
directly affects its activity? A possible explanation is that there is an
ontological difference in the structure of counter-terrorism sanctions (at stake
in A and others) and in that of sanctions against third country regimes,137
despite the fact that neither Article 215 nor Article 275 TFEU makes a
distinction between these two categories of measures. Individuals targeted by
the former can simply challenge the listing Decision; non-State actors
blacklisted by the latter have additional hurdles to climb. Indeed, the Council
may decide to impose prohibitions designed to isolate the concerned third
country and may define in a general and abstract manner the categories of
134. Rosas, “EU restrictive measures against third States: Value imperialism, future gesture
politics of judicial extravaganza,” (2016) Dir. Un. Eur., 650.
135. The need to provide “sufficient scrutiny so as to avoid arbitrariness” by national courts
when they assess the legality of freezing orders enacted by UN members to implement a
Security Council Resolution is also recognized by ECtHR in Al-Dulimi, Appl. No. 5809/08,
para 146.
136. Case C-158/14, A and others.
137. For an in-depth study comparing sanctions on third country regimes and sanctions
countering terrorism, see Eckes, “EU restrictive measures against natural and legal persons:
From counterterrorist to third country sanctions,” 51 CML Rev. (2014), 869–905.
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persons hit by the sanction. The ECJ cannot interfere with the Council’s
discretion. That is why individuals affected by sanctions concerning a third
country are in a worse position than suspected terrorists when they seek to
challenge their listing; and even if they are included in the blacklist, they are
prevented from contesting the prohibitions enshrined in the CFSP Decision.
This situation is not satisfactory for individuals from the perspective of the
right of access to justice.
5.7. No limits to the challenge of regulations based on Article 215 TFEU
and the uncertainty as to the legal standing conditions operating on
natural and legal persons’ challenges of these acts
Rosneft clarifies that the ECJ has the full power to review regulations adopted
under Article 215 TFEU in annulment actions, as well as under pleas of
illegality, despite the adoption of the act being contingent on the adoption of a
CFSP decision. In contrast to CFSP decisions providing for restrictive
measures, the challenge to regulations is in no way restricted by Article
275(2) TFEU, as they are acts adopted on the basis of the TFEU. There is some
uncertainty, though, as to the conditions to which the challenge of a regulation
under Article 215 TFEU is subject. In Sina Bank138 these conditions seem to
be that the provisions of the regulation have to be of individual and direct
concern, as in the case of any measure of general nature. InBankMellat,139 the
General Court agreed to qualify a regulation adopted under Article 215(2)
TFEU as a “regulatory act”, thus making it possible for private parties to
challenge it without proving any individual concern. They have to show that
such an act directly affects them and does not entail implementing measures.
It is not clear what standing conditions private parties should therefore satisfy
in direct actions. In contrast to annulment actions, the plea of illegality does
not impose an obligation on private parties to fulfil any standing
requirements.140
5.8. Unsettled issues
Three legal issues were not addressed in Rosneft.141 The first concerns the
application of Foto-Frost to CFSP acts other than those providing for
138. Case T-67/12, Sina Bank.
139. In Bank Mellat the General Court considered as partially admissible an annulment
action against a provision of a regulation, prohibiting certain transfers to banks. See Case
T-160/13, Bank Mellat v. Council, EU:T:2016:331, para 66.
140. However, the TWD principle, limiting the availability of the plea of illegality to
applicants whose standing in annulment actions is not undisputed, should operate also in this
context.
141. The Court did not need to do so in the context of the ruling at hand.
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restrictive measures. The second is whether the ECJ is competent to hear a
preliminary ruling on the interpretation of a CFSP Decision, in addition to its
competence under Article 267(1)(b) TFEU. The third concerns actions for
failure to act, and actions for damages available to natural and legal persons,
challenging the Decisions referred to in the “clawback” provision in the last
sentence of Article 24(1)(2) TEU and Article 275(2) TFEU.
5.8.1. Can domestic courts refer to the ECJ in case of doubts on the
validity of all CFSP decisions?
It is not clear whether, after Rosneft, the possibility for a national court to ask
for a preliminary ruling on validity applies only in relation to the CFSP
Decisions referred to in Article 275(2) TFEU or to any CFSP act. The ruling
commented here does not address this issue. Of course, the arguments made
by the Court to support its competence under Article 267(1)(b) TFEU in
relation to restrictive measures could also apply to any CFSP Decision which
affects the position of individuals. For example, the ECJ, is in principle, better
placed than domestic courts to rule on the validity of CFSP Decisions; the
objective of ensuring a uniform application of EU law would be better
served.142 However, it is submitted that the Treaties, as they stand, provide an
insurmountable obstacle to such an interpretation. Article 275(2) TFEU, in
specifying that the CFSP Decisions referred to in Article 24(1) TEU are
subject to the control of legality of the ECJ, refers to “decisions providing for
restrictive measures”, which are a subset of all CFSP Decisions. Finally,
although the principle of effective judicial protection enables a strict
interpretation of the exclusion of the Court’s jurisdiction in the CFSP, Article
47 of the Charter (enshrining that principle), cannot confer jurisdiction on the
EU judiciary when the Treaty excludes it – as stressed by the ECJ in
Rosneft.143
5.8.2. Uncertainty as to the existence of a competence to rule in a
preliminary ruling on the interpretation of a CFSP Decision
The ECJ has recognized its competence to rule on the validity of a CFSP
decision providing for a restrictive measure, while it has not touched upon its
competence to interpret this act. The latter category of competence is no less
important than the former, in relation to ensuring the uniform application of
EU law and the coherence of the system of remedies. The national court, in all
142. Judgment, paras. 79–80.
143. Judgment, para 74. See also, along these lines, C-583/11 P, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami v.
Parliament, EU:C:2013:625, paras. 97–98.
CML Rev. 20171828 Case law
likelihood, will need the ECJ’s guidelines on the interpretation of CFSP
decisions, especially when the latter are not accompanied by regulations
giving effect to them. However, all this does not guarantee that the Court
would rule in favour of preliminary rulings on such interpretation. On the one
hand, in addition to the principle that its jurisdiction is excluded under Article
24(1) TEU, it should be noted that the types of actions envisaged by Article
275(2)TFEU refer to “review of legality” thus making it difficult to stretch the
meaning of this expression to include a preliminary reference on
interpretation.
Yet, Advocate General Wathelet’s argument that the possibility of
questioning the validity of a CFSP decision a fortiori implies the competence
of the ECJ to interpret this act, is convincing; the link between interpreting a
measure and assessing its validity was recognized inBusseni,144 with regard to
the ECSC Treaty, which is also quoted in Rosneft. In Busseni, it was explicitly
stated that in the context of that Treaty, the requirement of ensuring uniformity
in the application of the law is as cogent and obvious as it is in the EEC and
Euratom Treaties.145 Furthermore, it would be contrary to the objectives and
the coherence of the Treaties to “leave responsibility for determining the
meaning and scope of rules derived from the ESC Treaty exclusively in the
hands of the national courts, thereby depriving the ECJ of any power to ensure
they were given a uniform interpretation.”146 The reasoning requiring
the Court to provide the definitive interpretation of EU secondary law instead
of leaving this to the ECtHR in the prior involvement procedure147 could apply
to the relationship between the ECJ and national courts. Drawing from
Opinion 1/09, “it should . . . be recalled that Article 267 TFEU, which is
essential for the preservation of the Community character of the law
established by the Treaties, aims to ensure that, in all circumstances, that law
has the same effect in all Member States”.148
A further justification for extending the competence of the EU judiciary to
include interpretation of a CFSP decision is that this may be necessary in order
to elucidate the meaning of other provisions, such as those of a regulation if
adopted.149
144. Case C-221/88, Busseni, EU:C:1990:84.
145. Ibid., para 15.
146. Arnull, The European Union and its ECJ (OUP, 2006), p. 52.
147. Opinion 2/13, paras. 243–247.
148. Opinion 1/09, Patent Court, EU:C:2011:123, para 83.
149. The ECJ’s competence to issue a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of the
provisions of a regulation, is uncontested, as demonstrated in Case C-314/13, Užsienio
reikalu ministerija, EU:C:2014:1645, concerning the freezing of funds of a Belarusian citizen.
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5.8.3. Are actions for damages available to natural and legal persons
affected by a CFSD decision providing for restrictive measures?
One of the arguments underlying the Court’s interpretation of Article 275(2)
TFEU in Rosneft was that annulment actions and preliminary ruling
procedures can have the aim to review the legality of a CFSP decision.150
Article 275(2) TFEU does not provide for a competence to hear actions
regulated by Articles 265 TFEU (failure to act) or 340 TFEU (liability of the
Union), which has been conceived as an autonomous form of action,
independent of annulment proceedings.151 Therefore, in principle, a Treaty
revision would be needed to change the state of the law. In terms of practice,
the General Court’s ruling in Jannathianmay be mentioned, which denies the
existence of a competence to hear or determine any kind of claim for
compensation in connection with a CFSP decision.152 In contrast to this
position, Advocate General Wathelet, in a footnote to his Opinion, denied that
the two actions are available against CFSP decisions against natural and legal
persons, without providing any further guidance.153
Focusing only on the remedy under Article 340 TFEU, so far the CJEU has
examined a number of actions in damages brought by applicants against
regulations giving effect to CFSP decisions, and has also upheld one on
appeal.154 Therefore, it might be thought there would be no need for the
addressees of restrictive measures to know if they can sue the Union for an
action in damages on the basis of a breach occurring as a result of an CFSP
Decision. Indeed, they can bring an action under Article 340 TFEU against a
regulation adopted under Article 215 TFEU. However, as shown in section 5.3
above, in Rosneft the possibility to challenge the Regulation did not prevent
the ECJ from asserting its competence to rule on the validity of the CFSP
Decision. The same position could be taken with respect to an action in
damages connected to a CFSP Decision. Moreover, once again, the adoption
150. Judgment, para 70.
151. Case 175/84, Khron v. Commission, EU:C:1986:85.
152. “It must therefore be held that a claim seeking compensation for the damage allegedly
suffered as a result of the adoption of an act relating to the CFSP falls outside the jurisdiction of
the Court.” Case T-328/14, Jannathian v. Council, para 31. The General Court’s position was
more cautious in the order in Case T-602/15, Liam Jenkinson v. Council, EU:T:2016:660; in
para 30, it stated: “It cannot be ruled out that the contractual and the non-contractual liability of
an EU institution may coexist in respect of one of the parties with which it has concluded a
contract.”
153. There was no need to deal with this specific issue. See footnote 36 of the Opinion
“Actions for failure to act and actions for damages which relate to a CFSP act are covered by the
‘carve-out’ . . . but not by the ‘claw-back’”.
154. Case C-45/15 P, Safa Nicu v. Council, EU:C:2017:402.
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of regulations under Article 215 TFEU is not mandatory; there may also be
cases in which sanctions set by a CFSP act are not given effect through a
non-CFSP measure, as in the case of restrictions on the admission of persons,
which are directly implemented by Member States. Leaving aside the added
value of the availability of an action in damages, could the ECJ interpret
“review of legality” to include non-contractual liability? The Commission
supported a positive answer in the Opinion proceedings 2/13.155 It could be
argued that although the purpose of an action in damages is not to review the
legality of a given EU act, such a remedy is complementary to the possibility
of contesting the validity of a CFSP decision and therefore should bepermitted
in a system of remedies where the right to effective judicial protection is
recognized by Article 47 of the EU Charter. However, on the whole, it is
uncertain whether it would be possible to interpret the above-mentioned
provision in such a way as to include the remedy provided for by Article 340
TFEU. On the hand, the coherence of EU system of remedies, which is at the
heart of Foto-Frost ruling, would require the ECJ to extend the availability of
the action in damages to CFSP Decisions. This would make the system of EU
remedies for natural and legal persons affected by sanctions almost complete.
On the other hand, there are limits to such an interpretation. Article 275(2)
TFEU does not include the non-contractual liability of the EU amongst the
exceptions to the limits on the ECJ’s jurisdiction. Moreover, Segi is an
important precedent, where the Court considered this action inadmissible
when interpreting Article 35 TEU.156
5.9. Interpretation of the compatibility of the contested CFSP Decision
with the “non-affectation clause” (Art. 40 TEU) and a missed
opportunity to shed light on what is a legislative act
The Court’s examination of the compatibility of the impugned CFSP Decision
with the non-affectation clause may be criticized. Rosneft contended that the
contested CFSP act defines the EU position in excessive detail, thus
encroaching on the powers of the High Representative of the Union and the
Commission to propose measures necessitated by the adoption of a CFSP
decision, as stipulated in Article 215(1) TFEU. The Court found that the
155. See Opinion 2/13, para 99.
156. This provision does not include the competence to examine an action in damages, and
the ECJ rejected these actions in Cases C-355/04 P, Segi and others, paras. 46–47 and C-340/04
P, Gestoras Pro Amnistia v. Council, EU:C:2007:115, paras. 46–47. This issue was also raised
by A.G. Kokott in her View in Opinion 2/13, para 94.
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Council needed to decide on the technical details of the sanctions in the CFSP
Decision, given the high degree of technicality of this field. This finding may
be questioned. Restrictive measures are adopted on the basis of Article 29
TEU, enabling the Council to “define the approach of the Union to a particular
matter of a geographical or thematic nature.” Should they set out the political
choices – such as the subjects that targeted and the design of the main features
of the sanctions – leaving all the technical details to the regulation necessary
to implement them? The two acts have different functions. However, in the
Council’s practice, everything is decided in the CFSP decision, and
the regulation merely reproduces the content of the decision. It seems that the
Council expressly wants to pre-determine the content of the regulation, with
the net effect of affecting the extent of the powers of the High Representative
and the Commission. By defining all the aspects of the sanction in CFSP
decisions, does the Council not impinge upon the power of the Commission or
the High Representative to propose and design a regulation? It is submitted
that it does. The Court could have said something to condemn this practice.
Rosneft further argued that the contested CFSP Decision constitutes a
legislative act by reason of its content, and was thus in breach of Article
24(1)(2) TEU, which excludes the adoption of legislative acts in the domain of
foreign affairs. It is true that there are CFSP Decisions which may be
described as legislative measures, given their content157 and therefore they
may be qualified de facto legislative acts, if not de iure. The Court does not
look at the content of the mentioned act in its formalistic analysis. The Grand
Chamber merely observes that the contested CSFP Decision cannot be a
legislative act, since it is has not been adopted by a legislative procedure.158
Since the Treaty does not offer any guidelines on what is a legislative act, this
was a missed opportunity for the Court to shed some light on this issue.
6. Conclusions
Rosneft strengthens the Court’s power to rule on the legality of restrictive
measures. However, it does not lead to ending the special status of the CFSP
compared with non-CFSP areas. The ECJ does not open up the possibility of
challenging all aspects of CFSP decisions providing for restrictive
157. This was admitted by A.G. Wahl in his Opinion in Case C-455/14 P, H., see his
footnote 51.
158. Judgment, para 91. See, later, on this point, Joined Cases C-643 & 647/15, Slovakia
and Hungary v. Council, EU:C:2017:631, where the ECJ confirmed that adoption through the
legislative procedure is what determines that a measure is a legislative act.
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measures.159 In addition, there are certain types of CFSP acts which continue
to be kept off-limits for the Court’s jurisdiction. The carve-out provisions of
the Treaties, limiting the ECJ’s jurisdiction, continue to apply to CFSP
decisions. This seems to be an acceptable limit from the perspective of the
right to an effective remedy, as these measures do usually concern third
countries rather than individuals. Nonetheless, there may be situations in
which a national measure, having the effect of depriving a person of his/her
liberty, is taken in the context of an EU military mission, authorized under a
CFSP act, as happened in the context of the Atalanta mission. In March 2009
a group of suspected pirates was arrested by German military personnel who
were operating under the command of the Eunavfor headquarters. They were
transferred to Kenya after an agreement was concluded between the two
countries. In May 2009, one of the arrested pirates brought an action before
the German administrative court claiming that both the arrest and the
transfer to Kenya were unlawful. The German court considered that the
conduct was attributable to Germany rather than to the EU, and found in
favour of the applicant on human rights grounds. A higher administrative
court substantially confirmed the ruling of the lower court.160 Does the
exclusion of the ECJ’s competence to deal with such situations lead to a legal
lacuna in the individual protection?161 The answer seems to be negative. It is
submitted that national courts are, in fact, best placed to provide access to
justice for persons concerned in such a situation. This is justified by the fact
that the contested conduct is attributable to the Member State rather than to the
EU.162 Moreover, the task to verify whether violations of human rights were
committed by the national authorities, albeit in the context of an EU operation,
can be performed by the national courts.
The second paragraph of Article 19(1) TEU imposes on Member States the
obligation to provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in
areas coming within the scope of EU law.Therefore, they can step in where the
jurisdiction of the ECJ is limited. It is true that this state of affairs presents
159. Only those, admittedly numerous, which target specific individuals. See on this point
section 5.6. supra.
160. See Sommario, “Attribution of conduct in the framework of CSDP missions:
Reflections on a recent judgment by the Higher Administrative Court of Nordrhein-Westfalen,”
in Poli (Ed.), Protecting Human Rights in the European Union’s External Relations (CLEER
Paper, 2016/5), p. 155.
161. Poli, “Human rights in EU external relations: Setting the scene,” in Poli, op. cit. supra
note 160, pp. 17–20.
162. Even if the conduct is attributable to the EU, Art. 274 TFEU makes it possible for
domestic courts to have jurisdiction on the disputes to which the EU is a party. See on this issue
Øby Johansen, op. cit. supra note 101, at 202.
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inconveniences: it is possible that national courts provide a different answer to
the question of whether or not international human rights standards are
violated in the instance of an operation carried by the EU. However, this is a
risk inherent to the EU system of decentralized control over CFSP acts.
Sara Poli*
* University of Pisa.
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